Sources of Change: Mass Political Behavior and Party Incentives

October 13, 2023
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Lilliana Mason

From More than Red and Blue: Political Parties and American Democracy

Abstract

Party reform is constrained to some degree by the behavior and attitudes of voters. Many political observers assume that voters behave consistently in their own economic self-interest. Most research on human behavior, however, undermines this assumption. This chapter lays out a description of the current political motivations driving voters, the biases they bring with them into the voting booth, and how the two parties are playing to different audiences using different tactics. It ends by offering some suggestions for change based in mass psychology and political identity.

Party leaders often respond to pressures from their most-ardent supporters, especially the most wealthy and reactionary.¹²³⁴⁵ But party supporters are not always looking out for the best interests of American democracy, the best interests of the American people, or even the material well-being of their own fellow partisans.⁶ Partisan voters are not motivated by simple economic self-interest or rational consideration of party platforms. Most partisans are driven by a desire for group status and victory over the enemy — even when that enemy is a fellow American.⁷⁸ Any effort to reform the parties will need to understand that voters are not always thinking of the greater good — they are often thinking mainly of victory.

The current social divide between the parties has upended the traditional understanding of American political behavior and encouraged identity-based grievance politics to proliferate.⁹¹⁰ It has also allowed “plutocratic priorities” to drive the majority of the Republican Party platform.¹¹¹² A more reasonable political future will rely on a realistic evaluation of partisan motivations, along with a forceful commitment to democracy from partisans across the spectrum of policy beliefs.

Importantly, partisan motives are not symmetrical across the two parties. The psychological motivations toward victory are universally applicable across all humans but are not currently being used to the same degree by Democratic and Republican leaders, as I describe below.

This chapter examines the current state of partisan sentiment among voters, explains the determinants and outcomes of voter behavior, and offers theoretically plausible paths toward deescalating an increasingly energized (and often extreme) electorate.

Identity-Based Polarization

The current priority of American partisans is partisan victory rather than government success.¹³ When group identities become the central drivers of political decision-making, group status can influence political decisions to an outsized degree.¹⁴ In this case, partisans prefer group victory (in elections or legislation) over the greater good of the nation or even the quality of life of their fellow partisans. The psychological motivations toward victory are well-documented in social psychology and tend to be involved whenever identities are made salient.¹⁵¹⁶¹⁷

Identity-based, (or “affective”) polarization has been increasing in the United States over the last few decades. While feelings toward people’s own party have remained relatively steady, the warmth of feelings toward the out-party has dropped consistently.¹⁸ Part of the explanation can be found in the changing relationship between multiple social identities in American politics. As Hajnal explains in Chapter 3 of this report, the Democratic and Republican parties have grown more consistently divided along the lines of powerful social identities such as race, religion, ideological identity, and rural consciousness.¹⁹²⁰ This “social sorting” means that election outcomes are linked to the status of other identities, like race and religion, not just the status of the parties. The stakes of such elections feel more dire to partisans. The social divide also means that partisans see less of their opponents in their everyday life. This lack of social contact with partisan opponents allows the other side to seem more extreme and provides less common ground for good-faith compromise.²¹²² In this scenario, partisanship can become a driver of political action, intolerance, ethnic resentment, and even violence.²³²⁴

Any effort to reform the parties will need to understand that voters are not always thinking of the greater good — they are often thinking mainly of victory.

The racial-partisan divide in particular has allowed American partisans to structure their partisan conflicts along pre-established lines of highly-charged conflict between white and Black Americans.²⁵²⁶²⁷²⁸²⁹³⁰³¹³²³³ The process of social sorting allowed the Republican Party to represent the interests of “traditional” white, Christian America while the Democratic Party was increasingly representing those who were still struggling to overturn centuries of social inequality. This type of divide is not easily corrected — Democrats and Republicans have opposing visions of who should hold power in American society and how much progress has already been made.³⁴³⁵

Party Asymmetry

Although all people are similarly influenced by the need for group victory, this impulse is particularly important for Republican politicians to harness. The Republican Party position on many important polices (abortion, gun control, corporate taxes, healthcare, industry regulation, Medicaid, infrastructure investments, etc.) run contrary to the majority of public preferences.³⁶³⁷³⁸ Partly because of the success of conservative and corporate lobbyists³⁹⁴⁰, partly due to the Trump administration’s focus on unpopular policy⁴¹, partly due to Republican elected officials’ misperceptions of the desires of their constituents⁴², and partly because of the over-representation of rural Republican voters⁴³, Republican politics often prioritize policies that do not reflect the majority opinions of Americans.

It is therefore in the interest of the GOP to take advantage of identity-centric rhetoric — which can motivate voters without offering them economic or practical benefits. As Hacker and Pierson⁴⁴ describe, “to deliver to the plutocrats yet still win elections, Republicans reached ever deeper into parts of the nation and segments of the electorate where conservative economic policies failed to stir voters’ passions but divisive appeals to identity did.” By leaning on threats to group status and grievance narratives, the Republican Party is uniquely positioned to benefit from partisan animosity and conflict. A straight governance debate does not benefit their candidates.

One caveat, however, is that a substantial portion of Americans are embarrassed to admit that they even hold partisan identities and have turned away from politics due to the nastiness and animosity on display in public political conflicts.⁴⁵ These Americans, though they are generally committed to one party, tend to be less involved in politics and also hold policy preferences that differ from those of the more active partisans.⁴⁶ A less divisive political atmosphere might allow them back into the fold. The next two sections explore possible avenues toward a less contentious politics.

Realignment Around Democracy

In Chapter 3 of this report, Zoltan Hajnal lays out a clear story of the realignment of the social groups that make up the two parties. In particular, Hajnal identifies the realignment of racial identities and attitudes along partisan lines as a response to the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. Effectively, the civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965 broke the Democratic Party — repelling its previously loyal bloc of White Southern Democrats. This led to decades of gradual partisan shifting — an era of weak and changing party loyalty. During this period, partisans were less committed to their parties, and somewhat more persuadable by party (and candidate) performance.⁴⁷

In today’s era of extremely powerful party loyalty, something like a new realignment focused on the importance of democracy may offer one avenue toward the marginalization of anti-democracy forces.

Partisanship is typically a very durable identity⁴⁸, so realignments tend to be rare. They can also be opportunistic. When one party does not offer sufficient benefits⁴⁹to a group of its core constituents, the opposing party may (as the Republican Party did to white Southern Democrats after the 1960s) reach out to attract those wavering voters.

Today, the Republican Party is united at the elite level in support of former President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda. Trump’s most fervent supporters are driven by animosity toward marginalized groups in the U.S.⁵⁰, conspiratorial thinking, and anti-democratic inclinations⁵¹⁵² (among other things). New research from the University of California, Davis Violence Prevention Research Program has identified “MAGA Republicans” as a distinct group of Republicans (defined as Republicans who voted for Trump in 2020 and agreed that the 2020 election had been stolen from Trump). In comparison with other Republicans who do not hold these views but nevertheless identify as Republicans, the MAGA Republicans are significantly more likely to agree that “having a strong leader is more important than having a democracy” (31% vs. 17%), and that “armed citizens should patrol polling places at election time” (19% vs. 5%). About a third of MAGA Republicans agreed that there will be a civil war in the US in the next few years, while only 7 percent of strongly-identified Republicans and 10 percent of weakly-identified non-MAGA Republicans believed the same. MAGA Republicans were also significantly and substantially more likely to agree that whites were being discriminated against (72%) and replaced (51%), to agree with the main tenets of the QAnon conspiracy theories (27-38% depending on the myth), and to believe that violence is justified in pursuing political goals — specifically goals supporting Donald Trump — with the goal of preserving “an American way of life based on Western European traditions.”⁵³

These “MAGA Republicans” are empirically different from “traditional” Republicans and may present an opportunity for a realignment around pro- versus anti-democracy values. They represent only one third of Republicans and 15 percent of the American population.⁵⁴ However, they control much of the leadership of the Republican Party, and therefore have outsized power in a two-party system.⁵⁵

Partisans also believe that their opponents hold much more extreme policy attitudes than they do in reality.

One opportunity for realignment would be for Democrats to reach out to pro-democracy Republicans in order to marginalize this MAGA faction of Americans. This would involve collaboration on democracy-related legislation and messaging. However, it would also entail difficult conversations about the other priorities of the government, and likely lead to voters rejecting these Republicans.

Another challenge is that demographic change is also occurring in the United States, and this process is pushing White Americans increasingly into the Republican Party.⁵⁶ Popular right-wing media are using the false narrative of the “Great Replacement Theory” to escalate white status threat.⁵⁷ Any pro-democracy coalition-building will face the challenge of racial and ethnic status threat in demanding attention from voters.

Given that the US is politically divided along racial and religious lines, institutional reform will be difficult. Furthermore, the less- partisan eras of this country’s history did not reflect societal peace or anything like racial justice — they were times when both parties embraced (or, at best, ignored) white supremacy. Going back to such an era would not be easy, or wise. Considering this, it could be instructive to turn to more individual-level psychological theories on reducing intergroup conflict in general.

Reducing Animosity Among Voters

While political leaders (especially on the right) appear to be committed to increasing animosity in the public, other forces could potentially slow or counteract these elite cues. It is important to note that these methods are generally useful for increasing tolerance across groups. Increasing tolerance of intolerance is not the intended use of these methods.

Motivated Reasoning

Partisan motivated reasoning can make it difficult to change partisan minds. Partisans seek out information that is beneficial to their party, and ignore or counter- argue information that harms their party.⁵⁸⁵⁹ Unfortunately, these effects are most common among those who are the most informed about politics and numerically literate.⁶⁰⁶¹ Even evaluations of objective economic conditions can be biased by partisan reasoning.⁶²⁶³

However, it is possible to counteract these motivations. By prompting partisans to think about civic duty or accuracy over partisanship, some partisans can overcome some of these biases.⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶ Removing a discussion from the political sphere and encouraging open-mindedness can also reduce motivated reasoning.⁶⁷

False Polarization

Americans tend to be wrong about the extremity of the other party. People overestimate the number of partisans who are members of stereotypically-partisan groups.⁶⁸ When people are told the correct numbers, however, they see members of the other party as less extreme and feel less socially distant from them. Partisans also believe their opponents hold much more extreme policy attitudes than they do in reality. That belief increases the policy extremity of those who believe it.⁶⁹⁷⁰ Partisans also overestimate the violence of their opposing party. When these misperceptions are corrected, they approve less of political violence.⁷¹

Extreme and incorrect portraits of partisan opponents tend to make partisan conflict worse. Changing voters’ assumptions about their opposing party (while difficult) could therefore reduce conflict. This could be aimed at partisan media, social media, and even interpersonal communications. Elected leaders could reinforce messages of similarity rather than exaggerating difference.

Superordinate Identity

A classic approach to reducing intergroup conflict is to emphasize a superordinate group identity.⁷² Increasing attention to a shared superordinate identity can increase communication across groups⁷³, and has been shown to reduce affective polarization in the US between Democrats and Republicans.⁷⁴

However, a threat to a superordinate identity cannot always improve intergroup relations — at times it can worsen conflict. In particular, when there is little trust between groups, and contempt or fear between them, group members can respond to a common threat by scapegoating and blaming the outgroup rather than cooperating.⁷⁵ For example, any national rallying effect from the COVID pandemic was blunted by partisanship in the US, where interparty tensions were already high and the pandemic response was politicized.⁷⁶⁷⁷

Cross-Pressures

Social identities can reduce the biasing effects of partisanship if they are “cross-cutting” or act as “cross-pressures”.⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰⁸¹ This happens when people from opposing parties are also members of the same social group. When partisans are exposed to cross-cutting social networks, they tend to grow more politically tolerant⁸²⁸³, engage in less partisan-motivated reasoning⁸⁴, engage in higher quality political thinking⁸⁵, consume less partisan media (Scacco and Peacock 2013), and think of themselves in more non-partisan terms⁸⁶. They also, unfortunately, tend to participate less in politics.⁸⁷⁸⁸⁸⁹

Contact Theory

Social contact across opposing groups can reduce prejudice between them.⁹⁰ In fact, contact can also reduce prejudice “vicariously,” simply by exposure via friends-of-friends or even media exposure.⁹¹ But caution should be used, as contact can backfire in the case of intractable conflicts. Cross-cutting political discussions can also reduce partisan animosity.⁹² Unfortunately, contact between Democrats and Republicans in the US has become increasingly rare, as partisans have grown geographically segregated.⁹³⁹⁴⁹⁵

Elite Rhetoric

Partisans in the public respond to elite polarization with partisan animosity⁹⁶ and stronger reliance on partisan cues to form opinions about policy.⁹⁷⁹⁸ Elite incivility can generate anger in the mass public⁹⁹ and a more combative form of partisanship.¹⁰⁰. Political leaders even have the power to reduce approval of political violence among partisans¹⁰¹ By observing leaders, partisans learn which norms and values are most important to the party. The public enforcement (or lack thereof) of those norms can shape the behavior of loyal partisans.

Social Norms

Social norms are the rules that group members follow and enforce. Generally, norm enforcement happens via social sanctions.¹⁰² Conformity with group norms attracts peer approval and feelings of pride while deviance from group norms leads to disapproval and feelings of shame.¹⁰³ If party leaders enforce norms of tolerance and cooperation, animosity can be reduced. However, the opposite is also true — norms of extremism and intolerance will inspire political conflict. Reform can happen when new social norms (“what should be”) work together with party loyalty to gather support for new approaches.¹⁰⁴ Leader rhetoric can shape whether citizens see politics as a realm of conflict or one of cooperation.

Conclusion

Although realignment seems unlikely and individual approaches are hard to scale, the hope is that a creative remedy can be gleaned from these findings. This scholarship can provide some insights into potential opportunities (and difficulties) in pursuing a better pattern of behavior from both leaders and regular citizens. From a structural level, a new partisan coalition between Democrats and pro-democracy Republicans could weaken blind partisan loyalty among at least some segment of the electorate. This approach would likely need to take advantage of an emerging rift within the Republican Party. On an individual level, research on intergroup conflict has identified multiple mechanisms by which group-level animosity can be reduced. If party leaders are not acting responsibly, it may be possible (though unlikely) to encourage voters to require better behavior of them via alternative leaders. Whatever the case, any plans for democratic reforms would do well to consider the deep-seated motivations of partisans in the electorate.

The analysis, views, and conclusions contained herein reflect those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of the American Political Science Association or Protect Democracy.

About the Author

Lilliana Mason

Johns Hopkins University

Learn more about Lilliana Mason

Sources of Change: Mass Political Behavior and Party Incentives

From More than Red and Blue: Political Parties and American Democracy

Abstract

Identity-Based Polarization

Party Asymmetry

Realignment Around Democracy

Reducing Animosity Among Voters

Motivated Reasoning

False Polarization

Superordinate Identity

Cross-Pressures

Contact Theory

Elite Rhetoric

Social Norms

Conclusion

The analysis, views, and conclusions contained herein reflect those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of the American Political Science Association or Protect Democracy.

About the Author

Lilliana Mason

Johns Hopkins University

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From More than Red and Blue: Political Parties and American Democracy

Abstract

Identity-Based Polarization

Party Asymmetry

Realignment Around Democracy

Reducing Animosity Among Voters

Motivated Reasoning

False Polarization

Superordinate Identity

Cross-Pressures

Contact Theory

Elite Rhetoric

Social Norms

Conclusion

The analysis, views, and conclusions contained herein reflect those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of the American Political Science Association or Protect Democracy.

About the Author

Lilliana Mason

Johns Hopkins University

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Pro-Democracy Centrist Voters and Moderate Party File Brief Challenging New Jersey’s Unconstitutional Ban on Fusion Voting

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