Frequently asked questions about the 2026 midterm elections

Can Trump cancel or postpone the 2026 midterm elections?

No. 

Federal law mandates that the general election take place the first Tuesday after the first Monday in even numbered years, meaning that Election Day is established by law, for both presidential and Congressional elections. It would take an act of Congress to change the date; the President has no authority to order that an election be canceled or postponed.

Primaries and elections for state offices are a slightly different story. Because it’s logical, cost effective, and efficient, most states hold their general elections on the same date as federal elections, but still the day is determined by law. Primary dates are also written into each state’s election code, and can only be altered through legislation (as happened in Pennsylvania in 2020), though in some cases state parties can decide on the rules of primaries (as happened in Texas this year). 

Though less relevant for this question, it is worth noting that there are also federal laws that govern special elections for Congressional seats, guidance for extending or postponing voting when necessary in cases of emergency, and state laws that determine when and how to hold municipal elections. The important thing to remember is that it is a combination of governors, state legislatures, the courts, and potentially Congress that can make decisions in these scenarios, never the president.

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Can Trump legally “nationalize” our elections?

No.  

The U.S. Constitution explicitly gives states the authority to determine the “Times, Places and Manner” to run federal elections and carefully limits federal involvement in election administration. Because each state has its own set of laws and policies, our federalized, decentralized system of election administration means there is not really anything to “nationalize.” That doesn’t mean that there is no role for the federal government — the Founders gave Congress the power to make and change election laws — primarily for federal elections. At certain times in American history, the federal government has had to step in to protect voters and make the process more fair and efficient (see: the Voting Rights Act and the National Voter Registration Act, among others).

President Trump has issued two executive orders purporting to outline new rules and guidelines for elections, but like any executive order (EO), these have to be able to hold up in court. A March 2025 EO on elections has largely been struck down. The second elections EO, issued at the end of March 2026, was blocked by the Supreme Court, which held that the Constitution gives the states — not the president — authority over elections. The law is very clear that the president has no authority to mandate how states should administer elections, and so far, the courts have ruled accordingly. Significant changes at the federal level would have to come from Congress or a specific agency — never the president.  

Even in cases of national emergencies, while the president has temporary access to 130 emergency powers, these authorities are limited to specific areas, such as aspects of foreign policy and public health. No emergency power exists that would explicitly give the president control over elections. None of the emergency powers that Congress has pre-approved would give President Trump the ability to lawfully postpone or cancel elections, ban mail-in voting, send armed federal agents to polling locations (unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States.”), or otherwise “nationalize” election administration. 

Any attempt by the president to “take over the voting” would be illegal and signals a politically-motivated attempt to expand and entrench his own power. 

For more on the emergency powers and federal overreach:

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What if there are claims of foreign interference in the election?

There is no evidence that foreign governments have successfully interfered in recent federal elections, and this would be a difficult task for any government. That’s because of the security of the American electoral system, and because our elections are so decentralized. The federal government does not directly oversee elections. Instead, the Constitution gives the responsibility for deciding the “time, place, and manner” of elections to each state, which means that elections are run differently from state to state, and election rules are often even more localized than that. 

As a result, foreign interference would require both a deep understanding of how elections operate across various states, and a coordinated effort to interfere with the running of elections across each of those states. 

Decentralization is only part of the reason U.S. elections are so reliably secure. Elections are subject to robust monitoring programs designed to catch any potential interference, and because the systems are not national, any interference can quickly be localized and contained. 

How to respond to claims of foreign interference

While election security experts are always concerned about the threat of foreign interference, the more acute threat to the 2026 midterms is coming from the federal government itself. That’s why it’s crucial to treat claims that come from this administration with skepticism and a clear-eyed understanding of how they will likely use any such claims. 

This administration, which has control over much of the intelligence gathered over the past decade, could very well work to politicize that intelligence with the goal of undermining confidence in the 2026 election, or any other previous election for that matter. In doing so, they would be attempting to undermine faith in future elections. 

That strategy is not going to work. American elections are safe, secure, and the outcomes are free from foreign interference. Any claims to the contrary, especially coming from this White House, are much more likely to be designed to undermine the credibility of past and future elections than they are to be legitimate.

What are the roles of states and the federal government in elections?

States have the constitutional responsibility to determine the “Times, Places, and Manner” of federal elections. However, the Constitution gives Congress the power to make or change election laws that apply to states with respect to federal elections, making it the ultimate authority on these elections. Meanwhile, constitutional amendments have also empowered Congress to protect certain voting rights in all elections. The president has no explicit powers with regard to elections. 

The federal role in elections has expanded over the last 60 years to include:

  • Setting minimum standards: Through laws like the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), the federal government mandates certain requirements, such as providing mail-in registration forms at DMV offices and establishing provisional ballot systems.
  • Protecting rights: The Voting Rights Act (VRA) and various Constitutional Amendments (15th, 19th, 24th, 26th) allow the federal government to intervene if states engage in discriminatory practices related to race, sex, age, or wealth (e.g., poll taxes).
  • Funding and assistance to states: The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) oversees certification for election equipment pursuant to voluntary guidelines and serves as a clearinghouse for best practices and distributes federal grants to states to help upgrade voting equipment and improve security. As of July 2026, the president removed all EAC commissioners, leaving the commission without the quorum it needs to take official action such as certifying voting systems — an unprecedented step whose legal validity may be tested in court.
  • Election security: In recent years, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took on a larger role in protecting election “critical infrastructure” from cyber threats and foreign interference. That involvement has been reduced in the current administration, and it remains unclear what its election security role will be in the current election cycle.
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Are mail-in and overseas ballots secure? 

Yes.

In all 50 states and Puerto Rico, mail-in and overseas ballots are subject to a series of security measures and undergo a rigorous verification process. Every state has its own method for verifying mail ballots, but the most common one is to require signature verification, where election officials carefully compare the signature on a voter’s mail-in ballot to the voter’s signature on other documents in their file. For military and overseas voters, there are procedures and rules pursuant to federal statute.

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Can federal agents seize ballots or voting machines?

Federal law gives the attorney general narrow access to election records: the right to inspect or copy certain records after an election, with a stated reason, but not to take the originals (52 U.S.C. § 20703). State officials can decline and ask a court to weigh in. States also have strict chain-of-custody rules that limit who can handle ballots, machines, and other materials.

What to watch for: Law enforcement could try to seize ballots, machines, or records while the count is still under way, most likely in the first few days after polls close. That might break the chain of custody, the record of who handled each ballot and when, and could make it difficult for local and state officials to complete state-law mandated processes for counting, canvassing, and ensuring the reliability of results, and ultimately certifying the winner. State officials and courts have tools to prevent a seizure and respond quickly if one occurs to ensure that the election can still be certified.

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Is refusing to certify an election legal?

State laws say that certification is a mandatory, ministerial duty, meaning that county election officials cannot refuse to sign the certification papers. It’s not an accident that certification is mandatory. It was codified into law in direct response to past partisan attempts to sabotage certification in order to change election outcomes — attempts which both lawmakers and the courts recognized as a threat to democracy.

What’s more, there are concrete tools in place to ensure that those who refuse to certify are held accountable, whether through civil or criminal consequences. In spite of these accountability measures, some local election officials have embraced conspiracy theories around recent elections and refused to certify results. In every such instance the election was ultimately certified, whether by court order requiring certification or administrators eventually opting to perform their legal duties.

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How is voter fraud properly addressed?

If voter fraud is suspected, there is a process to investigate claims and get to the bottom of it. In most cases, claims would be referred to state law enforcement, and the Attorney General and/or local district attorneys would investigate. Since states have the authority to run elections, they are responsible for passing laws that spell out how to address voter fraud and enforce election crimes. The federal government does have a limited, legitimate role — the Department of Justice can enforce certain federal election laws, and federal prosecutors can bring charges in specific cases. What it cannot do is use that authority as a pretext to intimidate officials, seize election materials, or manufacture doubt about results.

While a proven case of voter fraud would be a serious matter, when it has occurred, it has been on a statistically insignificant level. For example, between 2005 and 2022, the state of Texas detected fraud in only 0.000096% of all ballots cast in those 17 years. In other words, they confirmed 103 cases of voter fraud in over 107 million ballots. And, importantly, though voter fraud is incredibly rare, it is almost always caught, because the safeguards in place to detect it work. 

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Is there a role for the U.S. military in policing elections?

No.

Since the 1870s, federal law has expressly prohibited federal troops from engaging in any form of civilian law enforcement. Even if extraordinary circumstances triggered one of the narrow exceptions, such as the need to repel an actual “insurrection,” other parts of the federal code impose specific restrictions on the conduct of federal troops during our elections:

  • 18 U.S.C § 592 bans armed federal forces from “any place where a general or special election is held, unless such force be necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States.” 
  • 18 U.S.C § 593 prohibits all federal forces from threatening, intimidating, or coercing voters and interfering with election officers’ ability to do their jobs.  

All of these limits apply equally to National Guard units when they are in federalized status. When National Guard units are under state control, the specific limitations on federal troops do not apply, but federal law still makes it a crime for anyone — federal troops, state National Guard personnel, or others — “to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote.” State laws also impose additional limitations during elections and around polling places that would apply to National Guard personnel under state control. A very limited exception has been some state National Guard support for election cybersecurity or helping, out of uniform, as poll workers.

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Can anyone stop the vote count?

Counting is required by law. After polls close, officials count every valid ballot and double-check the totals in a process called the canvass. Courts have generally held that halting a count does lasting harm to voters and isn’t appropriate in ordinary election disputes.

What to watch for: Someone could try to make the ordinary count look suspicious, through demands to stop counting, early claims of victory, threats, or fights over who may observe. None of that changes the law. And in most cases nothing has gone wrong at all. The process and safeguards are doing what they’re supposed to do.

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Can my registration or ballot be challenged?

Challenges must have a real legal basis. The National Voter Registration Act bars systematic purges of the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election, and late purges can be challenged in court. In most states, a challenge based only on a database match isn’t enough and poll workers can dismiss frivolous challenges. A database flag is not proof that someone isn’t a citizen. Federal citizenship checks have mistakenly flagged eligible citizens in at least five states.

What to watch for: Large numbers of ballots or registrations could be challenged at once, through federal demands, state database matching, or filings by outside groups, using error-prone data close to Election Day. An eligible voter who is challenged at the polls can still cast a provisional ballot, which is counted once their eligibility is confirmed.

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Is the 2026 election already stolen?

No!

Between the Trump administration’s inflammatory rhetoric on the right and new anxieties about election interference on the left, it can be difficult for voters to know what to think about the security of the 2026 midterms.

The honest answer: The machinery of the 2026 election — who runs it, how ballots are cast and counted — has not been fundamentally changed. The president has no lawful authority over how states run elections, and the courts have repeatedly said so. That does not mean nothing has happened. Rulings like Louisiana v. Callais have weakened long-standing voting-rights protections, and the administration has spent the year testing the system’s limits. But the structures that make a free and fair election possible remain in place, and the people who run our elections are still doing their jobs.

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Could the current Congress refuse to seat winners in the next Congress?

No, and this is a common misunderstanding.

The House that judges who is entitled to a seat is the new one that convenes on January 3, not the outgoing (lame-duck) one. When the current House’s terms end at noon, the old House — its speaker, its majority, its committees, its rules — ceases to exist. The current House can hold hearings or pass resolutions before it concludes, but nothing it does binds how the new House organizes itself. The new House starts fresh and judges every seat for itself.

This is what commentators miss when they warn that a “lame-duck” House majority could refuse to seat incoming members. By the time the new Congress meets, the old one is gone. There is no “House” left to do the refusing.

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What should I worry about?

For the first time in modern American history, the greatest threat to our elections is coming from inside the White House. President Trump is dusting off his old playbook — now supercharged with the power of the federal government — of attempting to deceive voters, disrupt processes, and deny results that don’t fall in his favor. 

The top threats to be aware of are:

  1. Deception via conspiracies and lies from inside the White House; 
  2. Deployment of federal power against political opponents, organizations, and officials;
  3. Intimidation at or near polling places — including the threatened presence of ICE or other armed federal agents, which civil-rights groups warn could deter eligible voters;
  4. Manipulation of election rules to block eligible voters; and
  5. Seeking to overturn the results if favored candidates lose.

That list is real, and we don’t want to minimize it. But here is the thing every one of these tactics has in common: None of them works unless people go along with it. Each depends on officials, courts, or the public accepting a premise that isn’t true — and so far, they haven’t. 

It may seem cliche, but citizens have more power than you may realize, not just because of what your vote says. If the administration is spending so much time and effort trying to dilute your vote, it is for a reason. Every step you take to cast a vote that cannot be prevented, challenged, or rejected, is a triumph against a more authoritarian form of government.

Here’s what you can do:

  • Stay informed about election-related legislation in Congress and in your state legislature, plus any policy changes from your state’s chief elections officer, so you are prepared to cope with any changes. 
  • Check your voter registration status early to make sure your registration is still active and you know where you can vote. 
  • Make a plan to vote in a way that follows instructions to a tee in your state, and, therefore, is least likely to be challenged. If you plan to vote in person on Election Day or during early voting, make sure you know where to go and give yourself plenty of time. If voting by mail, return your ballot as early as practical, either to a dropbox or a mailbox (and mail it in at least 6-7 days before Election Day to make sure it arrives on time). Pay special attention to the rules to complete and validate your mail ballot and its envelope.
  • Collect your documents and keep them readily available if need be. Check the voter id rules in your state, and know how to access your proof of citizen documentation just in case. Hopefully you won’t need any of these things, but it’s better to be prepared if your vote or your eligibility is challenged. 
  • Talk to your friends, family, and neighbors and have them check their registration status and plan to vote. Share accurate information about voting rules and safeguards.
  • Don’t panic. Authoritarianism is about control — sometimes of our physical surroundings, but just as often of our attention and our emotions. Keep your attention on what matters to you and what is in your control.
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About the Authors

Emily Rodriguez

Strategic Communications Lead, Free and Fair Elections

Emily Rodriguez is the strategic communications lead on elections for Protect Democracy, specializing in election security and litigation, as well as state-level strategic plans.

Holly Idelson

Policy Strategist

Holly Idelson advocates for democracy reforms to promote the rule of law, uphold separation of powers and advance voting rights and election administration.

Alexandra Chandler

Director of Impact Programs, Free and Fair Elections

Alexandra Chandler oversees Protect Democracy’s teams that protect free and fair elections and the infrastructure for electoral competition at the national and state levels, as well as national security policy and advocacy.

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